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soldier is a day-laborer in the work of blood; the assassin is a jobber at the same trade. The assassin is better paid than the soldier; for the former was promised a thousand dollars for killing one man, while the latter might kill a hundred in a day without getting half a dollar for the whole. The soldier agrees to kill any and all whom the nation may bid; and, if required to shoot his own father or mother, brother or sister, wife or child, he must shoot them, or be shot himself; whereas the assassin, had he refused to kill the old man according to agreement, would not himself have been liable to be hung.

Truly, the soldier makes a fearful bargain. If he refuses to kill any whom the nation may bid him kill, he must himself be put to death, he nevertheless enters into the bloody compact, not knowing but he may be ordered to shoot or stab his own parents, wife or children. Not quite so bad the assassin's bargain. Had Crowninshield engaged to kill at any time any body whom the Knapps might wish to have killed, with the understanding that he should himself be put to death if he ever refused to kill any one they should bid, there would be a pretty close analogy between his case and that of the professed soldier. But the assassin's position was not so terrible. The soldier must kill whomsoever his employers may bid him kill, or the terms of his contract make him liable to be shot or hung himself.

Now, tell us why a hired assassin, like Crowninshield, should be hung as a monster of wickedness, while the soldier, hired by twenty millions to do the *same deed by wholesale*, is admired and eulogized as a hero? To kill *multitudes* at the bidding of millions, is deemed patriotic, glorious, worthy of songs, and eulogies, and monuments; but to kill *one man* at the bidding of another one, is denounced as base, infamous, diabolical, deserving of the gallows, of eternal infamy. Well did Bishop Porteus say,

"One murder makes a villain;
Millions a hero."

HOW WAR-HABITS CHEAPEN LIFE.—In Belgium it seems that the military idea of honor has a remarkable force. Two common soldiers, recently under arrest in the same cell, played cards to pass away the time. One of them lost the few sous he had in his possession, then his clothes, and finally staked his life. He lost. Next morning he was found hanging to a peg in the wall, his companion sleeping serenely on the pallet.

UNION IN PEACE—WHY SOUGHT, AND HOW SECURED.

In such an enterprise as this every one must see the *need of specific, associated efforts*. The object itself is sufficiently distinct; as much so as that of temperance, of missions, or any other benevolent enterprise. It is clearly important enough to justify and require such efforts. It is tributary to the highest interests of mankind, fraught with the weal or the woe of our whole race for time and eternity. It is difficult to conceive an enterprise aiming to prevent more evil, or to secure a greater amount of good; and surely an

object so immensely important may rightly demand the special, associated efforts of good men. In no other way can it ever be accomplished; for the evil will no more cure itself than would slavery, the slave-trade, or intemperance, paganism, or any other evil that has been wrought into the web and woof of a world's habits for ages. A delusion so long cherished, and fortified by so many and so powerful influences, can be dislodged from the general mind only by specific and long-continued efforts. The evil itself is specific; Christianity has provided a specific remedy; and of this remedy, Christians must make a direct, specific application, before they can expect a thorough cure of the war-gangrene festering for so many centuries on the bosom of universal humanity. We need this reform, also, to clear the skirts of Christians themselves from the guilt of war, to exhibit our religion of peace in its original purity, and thus pave the way for the world's speedy conversion; nor can we doubt that the extinction of war through Christendom would operate as life from the dead to the church, and prove the harbinger of her millennial triumphs and glories.

The successful prosecution of this great Christian Reform obviously requires the cordial union of all its friends; nor do we see any reason why they should not unite, since they all alike believe that war ought to be abolished, and differ only in their mode of reaching this conclusion.

A very few assert the unlawfulness of *all* physical force, and deny the right of one man to punish, coerce or even rule another;—positions to which no peace society, however, has ever been committed, which our own has always regarded as foreign from its object, and which most men would deem subversive of all human government and all social order. Others, assuming the strict inviolability of human life, oppose war mainly as a wholesale violation of this simple, comprehensive principle;—a principle adopted by a small portion of the friends of peace, but never recognized as the basis of our cause; a principle involving, of course, the abolition of all death-penalties, and extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be reconciled with the safety or legitimate functions of government. A third class, far outnumbering both the former, discard this principle, yet deem all war contrary to the gospel; while a fourth class, more numerous than all the foregoing, think it right for nations to draw the sword in strict self-defence, that is, when their only alternative is to kill or be killed, yet hold the *custom itself* in deep abhorrence, and sincerely desire its abolition. Now, we wish to unite all these classes of peace men, unless perhaps the first one be too small to be noticed; and we would fain unite them by constructing a platform on which they can all consistently work together for their common purpose, the abolition of war. On this point they perfectly agree; and, since their object is the same, we would let them all labor for it, each in his own way, without making one responsible for the views of another.

Let us see, then, on what terms the friends of other causes have united. They have required, not perfect uniformity of views, but only cordial, active co-operation for

the attainment of their common object. If a man would from *any* motives unite with them in putting an end to the slave-trade or intemperance, he was welcomed as a coadjutor, and left to take such views, and urge such arguments, as he himself felt most, and therefore thought likely to make the best impression upon others. Every cast of mind was to be met; and hence all were not only permitted, but desired to press each his own favorite arguments upon men of kindred stamp.

Here is sound good sense; nor do we see why it should not be applied to peace, and all its professed friends be allowed to retain their present views, and still co-operate, if they will, for their common object. There are points of coincidence between them sufficient for this purpose. They are one in their desires for the abolition of war; they agree in most of their views touching peace, and differ only on one or two points; they would, in laboring for their common cause, use essentially the same means, and the diversity in their modes of exhibiting the subject, is in fact necessary to reach with the best effect all the variety of minds that we wish to enlist.

The cause of peace, then, ought to be prosecuted with the same liberality as other enterprises, and all its friends be permitted, without rebuke or suspicion, to promote it in such ways as they respectively prefer. The test should be, not the belief of this or that dogma, but a *willingness to co-operate for the entire abolition of the War-System*, the practice of nations settling their disputes by the sword; and all that will do this, and just as far as they do it, should be regarded as friends of peace. If any doctrine be required as a test, let it be the broad principle on which the first General Peace Convention in London (1843) was constituted, viz., *that war is inconsistent with Christianity, and the true interests of mankind*. We grant that this language is somewhat indefinite, allowing a pretty free play of the pendulum; but this is just what we want in order to meet the diversity of opinion among the friends of peace. We can *make* it express the belief of *all* war unchristian; but it *pledges* us only to a condemnation of the custom. To this principle there can be no objection from any one willing to labor for the abolition of war; and hence the test of principle would in fact be the very test of action on which alone we insist. We ask men to abolish war; and, if they will gird themselves in earnest for this work, we would let them do it in their own way, nor quarrel with them about their motives.

Any other course, indeed, must clog our cause with a variety of superfluous issues. Let us suppose you arguing against the slave-trade. Not satisfied with proving it wrong, you try to bring it under the condemnation of some general principle applicable to many other things — the principle, if you please, that all love of money, or all physical coercion of men, both of which are so deeply concerned in that trade, is unchristian. Your antagonist readily admits the *traffic* itself to be wrong, but joins issue on your general principle, and thus compels you to waste nearly all your strength upon what is not essential to your purpose. Were

you endeavoring to abolish duelling, would you first establish the principle, that self-defence, or the taking of human life in any case, or all use of brute force is unchristian, and then forbid the co operation of any that did not embrace one or all of these principles? True, if you prove either, you condemn duelling; but if neither is true, that practice may still be utterly wrong. So in peace. We prove it just as wrong for nations to fight as it is for individuals; but a stickler for simplification, presses us to know on what *principle* I condemn war. 'Principle! Why, we have just adduced a dozen in the shape of so many arguments against it.' "But on what *one* in particular do you deem it wrong? What is your stand-point?" If in reply we say, that human life is inviolable, or that the gospel discards all physical force, or forbids our injuring another for our own benefit, he starts at once a new trail of objections, not against our sole aim of abolishing war, but against our principle as applicable in his view to something else which he thinks right. He says it condemns capital punishment, and even subverts all human government; and thus he leads us away from our sole object into disputes which have little or no connection with peace. If you prove human life inviolable, or all use of brute force unchristian, you certainly condemn war *a fortiori*; but is it wrong on no other grounds? If it is, then let all who choose, discard it on those grounds, nor insist that they shall argue against it only in your or our favorite way.

It is thus we would plead for the cordial, zealous co-operation of *all* peace-men, and would fain take away from every friend of God or man the last shred of excuse for refusing to co-operate. Associated solely for the abolition of International War, they should be pledged only to that end, and allowed to retain each his own opinions, and to labor for their common object in such ways as they respectively prefer, without insisting upon any other basis of co-operation than the belief, that war, being inconsistent with Christianity, and the true interests of mankind, ought to be abolished. Such a course would remove not a few obstructions, conciliate a much larger number of co-workers, and pave the way for a speedier and more glorious triumph.

The time has come for a much more extensive rally in behalf of this cause than has ever yet been attempted. As one of the grandest interests of the world, we would urge its claims upon every friend whether of God or man. We would spread our sails for every breeze that may waft us sooner into the port of universal and permanent peace. We would press into our service every possible auxiliary. We need all the good influences of the world; and, should we make our platform broad enough to include all that are really desirous, from any motives, of putting an end to this custom, we might at length rally for its abolition every well-wisher to mankind.

It is by a very simple process we hope, under God, to reach this glorious result. Public opinion in the long run governs the world; and if we can once revolutionize the war-sentiments of mankind, and bring the custom under their universal ban, it must in time cease everywhere. It

exists solely because men still choose it; and, when nations shall all discard it as the arbiter of their disputes, or the instrument of their ambition, cupidity or vengeance, it will of course vanish from the earth like darkness before the rising sun, and give place to rational, peaceful methods, such as Stipulated Arbitration, or a Congress of Nations, more effectual for all purposes of protection or redress, than the sword ever was, or ever can be.

“THE CAUSE OF PEACE — WHAT IS IT?”

In the January number of the Advocate I find an article with the above title, to which I wish to call attention. The writer first tells us what he thinks the cause of peace is *not*, and then what he thinks it *is*. He says, “We go merely against the *custom of war*.” And war means “a contest of force between two nations. It can, in strict propriety of speech, exist only between *two distinct nationalities*.”

Now it seems to me that this close definition cuts off nearly all the strength of our cause. (1) If we must be limited thus, we can get no deep hold of the real cause of war. War between nations would never occur if it were not for our false notions, evil dispositions and wrong practices at home on this subject. Let us look at it a little. Why do we object to war between nations? Why is it wrong? I presume there might be a thousand reasons given, showing how inexpedient, irrational, unnecessary, expensive, destructive of human happiness, burdensome beyond measure, and after all, inefficient, this hideous practice of barbarity, this “concentration of all crimes,” this master-piece of the devil, really is.

But there is a reason which, I conceive, reaches higher and deeper and farther than all the rest. It is the reason of reasons, the one that gives rise to all others, around which all others cluster. It is simply this, war is wrong because it is *taking life* contrary to *God's authority*. (2) To this I presume all peace-men must agree. Because if we had God's authority, war would not be wrong, and would be productive of good. But the violation of God's will and law, are always attended with evil results.

Now, if taking the life of foreigners is a violation of God's authority, and, therefore, attended with evil, and not with good, does it not logically follow that taking the lives of our own citizens, violates God's authority, and likewise brings *evil*, and not *good*? Is it not correct to say that war is the business of killing men in large numbers by men? Does the cause for which they are killed, by one or the other party, give a right to change the name of the killing?

The article quoted says, “the cause of peace does not inquire how a people deprived of their rights may regain them.” If the Irish should rise up, and kill a hundred thousand English; if the French peasantry should take arms against the nobles, and produce a revolution; if the millions of blacks in the South should demand the right of suffrage by the blood of half a million whites, would these slaughters not be entitled to the name of war, and not come within the province of the cause of peace? (3)

But this, perhaps, involves the question of the inviolability of life, which, the writer tells us again, is not within the limits of our cause. I will agree with him that “the friends of peace are not associated to *resist* or *censure* the enforcement of law.” Certainly not to resist, and not to *censure* the enforcement of law. But the *manner* of the enforcement, if it violates the fundamental principles of peace, most certainly it is the *duty* of every Peace man, who believes that the principles of God's truth are good for

the world, to censure such *manner* of enforcement. Am I right? Can principles bend to fit men's preference and convenience? Can the great truths which underlie this cause, be varied to suit the false notions of men? (4) I can conceive that the cause of peace does not necessarily “embrace *all kinds* of peace,” just as “temperance does not include all kinds of temperance.” But if we have any great principle by which we expect war to be abolished, does not the subject embrace all kinds of peace where those central thoughts are involved? If the principles by which we expect to do away the *custom of war*, may be violated *ad libitum*, by rulers at home, then they are not principles, our cause is only a pretence, peace-men are a set of visionary speculators, our strength is gone. Is this radical? I see no consistency or propriety in raising a great noise about a pandemonium of wickedness away off in some foreign countries, while at home bloodshed may be legalized with impunity.

The great majority of the people say they are already in favor of peace except in some extreme cases, as they choose to call them. They already condemn the “*custom of war*.” (5) Then, taking the grounds of the article quoted, what point can we make? (6) Will the Editor, or some contributor, give us a few rays, as to what it is that we are to call the world's attention to, and the central thought or principle? “The cause of Peace — what is it?” W. G. H.

NEW VIENNA, Ohio.

COMMENTS. — Our friend may find in some foregoing articles a *virtual* answer to his queries; but, as he and others may desire something more definite on points suggested by him, we will append a few brief notes: —

1. Not at all; it rather strengthens by concentrating it. The more precise and definite the object of any enterprise like this, the greater and better will be its impression on the public mind. The cause of peace, as defined and prosecuted by us from the first, clearly allows, invites and demands the concentration upon it of not only everything that our friend suggests, but of all other facts, arguments and motives pertinent to the case.

2. This statement leaves untouched the real point in issue — whether *all* taking of human life is contrary to God's will. If it be, that settles the matter of course; but *does* the Bible, in the Old Testament or the New, declare it *always* wrong to take human life? The Peace Society says it is wrong to take life *in war*, but does not say whether it is so or not in cases not included in our cause.

3. The mere killing of men “in large numbers” is not necessarily war. In the reign of Henry VIII. more than 70,000 persons were hanged in England; but in all that judicial butchery there was no war, unless we give this name to every enforcement of law, and that would just make government itself little else than an incessant war upon its subjects. Because the enforcement of law in a given case sacrifices a multitude of lives, it may still be in principle only a legitimate operation of government, as during our late rebellion, in punishing its own subjects. The putting down of the New York riot in 1863 by a military force destroyed at least one or two thousand lives; but it was, in strict propriety of speech, no more war than any other riot or mob at any time in any part of the land. The